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PLAYTIMES
In modern culture, the element of play has long constituted a problem.1 Associated with either the past or a possible future, it often appeared as an anachronism. The 19th-century bour-geoisie, for example, relegated play to the past by identifying it 
almost exclusively with children, in a sphere increasingly separated from 
‘proper’ social life. Ernst Haeckel’s famous 1866 law, ‘ontogeny reca-
pitulates phylogeny’, was but one manifestation of a tendency in that 
period to construct parallels between the lives of individuals and those 
of the species; to relegate play and games to the sphere of the child was 
perhaps also to suggest a parallel in human history, to associate them 
with an earlier stage in the development of civilization. When the 19th-
century German educator Friedrich Fröbel stated that ‘play at this time is 
not trivial, it is highly serious and of deep significance’, the implication 
was that at other times—in life after childhood—it is indeed trivial.2 Its 
only function was as preparation for adulthood. Play and games had to 
be educational and constructive, readying boys and girls for their later 
respective roles, necessitating clearly distinct toys for each gender. 
Bourgeois moralists saw the less segregated sphere of the child among 
the working classes, on the other hand, as a dangerous admixture. 
Workers were seen as engaging in crude, bawdy behaviour and in highly 
suspicious games of chance, rather than in the one kind of game that 
would be beneficial to them: namely, organized sports. But for Johan 
Huizinga, in modern sport, with its emphasis on competition, profes-
sionalism and profit, ‘the old play-factor has undergone almost complete 
atrophy’.3 Huizinga was one of a number of thinkers who, either looking 
back nostalgically or announcing a new played future, criticized modern 
society for having abandoned play. While there may have been some com-
pensating developments outside of sports, for Huizinga nevertheless ‘the 
sad conclusion forces itself upon us that the play-element in culture has 
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been on the wane ever since the eighteenth century, when it was in full 
flower. Civilization today is no longer played.’4 
While Huizinga has long held sway over cultural analyses of play, in 
recent years the rise of ‘game studies’ has resulted in something of a 
paradigm shift. Play, so long alien to the way in which modern soci-
ety conceived of itself, has now become embedded in computer games, 
which constitute a bigger industry than Hollywood. Does this signal the 
obsolescence of older theories of play? Perhaps the very fact that these 
now look increasingly anachronistic gives them contemporary relevance: 
they may provide pointers for thinking and acting beyond the limitations 
of actually existing games.
Playing with beauty
If theory arrives on the scene once a phenomenon begins to lose its 
formerly self-evident character, it should come as no surprise that the 
modern theory of play has its origins in the moment when, accord-
ing to Huizinga, the play instinct had begun to wane. While Friedrich 
Schiller’s fifteenth letter from the Aesthetic Education of Man did not give 
such a stark diagnosis of the present, his notion of play already strad-
dled past and future—between the artistic heights of ancient Greece 
and a projected humanity mandated by reason—leaving the present as 
a divide to be bridged. Schiller posited a ‘play instinct’ that is the synthe-
sis of two drives existing in a dialectical tension: the ‘sensuous instinct’, 
which seeks immersion in sensuous and temporal life, and the ‘formal 
instinct’, which seeks to extract timeless ideas from the plenitude of 
life. Beauty can be neither pure life nor pure form, neither philosophi-
cal idea nor artistic abstraction. True beauty only exists due to the play 
instinct, in which man freely exercises his faculties in a dialogue with 
the world of the senses. It is only thus, in the resulting unity of reality 
and form, of the accidental and the necessary, of suffering and freedom, 
that man is truly complete. This was an aesthetic along Kantian lines: as 
in Kant’s third Critique, it is the task of beauty to reconcile reason and 
1 A version of this text was given as a lecture at the University of Groningen, on the 
invitation of Eric de Bruyn, to whom I am indebted for many stimulating exchanges.
2 Quoted in Maaike Lauwaert, The Place of Play: Toys and Digital Circles, Amsterdam 
2009, p. 46.
3 Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, Boston 1955, p. 198.
4 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 206.
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the senses.5 But departing from Kant, for Schiller beauty was rooted 
in play. ‘The object of the play instinct, represented in a general state-
ment, may therefore bear the name of living form; a term that serves to 
describe all aesthetic qualities of phenomena, and what people style, in 
the widest sense, beauty.’6
Stating that man only plays when he is fully man, and that he is only 
fully man when he plays, Schiller claimed that this insight would at once 
carry both the whole edifice of ‘aesthetic art’, and that of the even more 
difficult ‘art of life’. Such a proposition, he argued, was unexpected only 
for philosophers; it had been alive in the minds and the art of the ancient 
Greeks. Schiller’s text called for a project of aesthetic revolution that 
would avoid the violence done by the ‘mechanical artists’ of the French 
Revolution, wedding the Gestalten of reason organically to the material 
and sensuous world so as not to ‘injure the manifold in nature’. It is easy 
to see that such a project, meant to put the revolutionary transformation 
of society on a sure footing and complete it, could become an ideological 
alternative to political change; the ‘aesthetic revolution’ as a stand-in for 
the political one, rather than its fulfilment.
In Antiquity, the play drive had manifested itself in the Olympic Games, 
which came close to realizing the ideal: 
No error will ever be incurred if we seek the ideal of beauty on the same 
road on which we satisfy our play-impulse. We can immediately understand 
why the ideal form of a Venus, of a Juno, and of an Apollo, is to be sought 
not at Rome, but in Greece, if we contrast the Greek population, delighting 
in the bloodless athletic contests of boxing, racing and intellectual rivalry 
at Olympia, with the Roman people gloating over the agony of a gladiator. 
Now reason pronounces that the beautiful must not only be life and form, 
but a living form, that is, beauty, inasmuch as it dictates to man the twofold 
law of absolute formality and absolute reality. Reason also utters the deci-
sion that man shall only play with beauty, and he shall only play with beauty.7
For Schiller, the life of the gods on Mount Olympus as seen in Greek art 
was really the utopian vision of a true aesthetic life of play. Neither sub-
jugated by the laws of nature and necessity nor by a moral law, the god 
lived a truly free and carefree life. Sculptures such as the Juno Ludovisi 
could give a glimpse of it; they were perhaps the true reflection of the 
5 See letters 12–15 in Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794), 
New Haven 1954. 
6 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, letter 15. 7 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, letter 15.
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highest form of play. There was, then, a distinction between actual 
games as part of the ‘art of life’ (Olympia) and the sovereign play of 
‘aesthetic art’ (Olympus). And yet Schiller faulted the Greeks for only 
being able to envisage the triumph of play in an oneiric, mythical form: 
the Greeks ‘removed to Olympus what ought to have been preserved on 
earth’. He seemed to demand that the ‘art of life’—the heavenly vision 
of Olympus—be realized on earth. This realization would transcend the 
limitations of forms such as the Olympic Games. Olympia was revealed 
to be only an impoverished stand-in for the true art of life.
Schiller almost pushed his romantic return to an idealized past to the 
point where it became an avant-garde project; he put such emphasis on 
the interconnection between the fine arts and the art of life that one may 
well have drawn the conclusion that the Greeks ultimately failed by pro-
jecting their highest ideals onto Mount Olympus, and that we should 
go beyond them by taking Olympus down to earth. While the Olympic 
Games present an ideal of actual game-activity far superior to modern 
games, they nonetheless limited the play impulse by imposing rather 
rigid rules on living form. Schiller thus introduced the topos of the funda-
mental inadequacy of actual games; of their betrayal of the ideal of play.
In 1838 August Cieszkowski offered an important early critique of 
Schiller’s theory in his Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, which effectively 
positioned itself as a philosophical synthesis of Schiller and Hegel. 
Cieszkowski argued that Hegel had been wrong to place philosophy (his 
own philosophy) at the apex of history. It was true that Hegelian philoso-
phy represented the culmination of the modern, Germano-Christian era, 
but this was only the second of three dialectically evolving historical peri-
ods: there was one still to come. In classical antiquity, art had been the 
appropriate manifestation of Geist, as the first reconciliation of Spirit with 
nature; but this reconciliation was still outward and accidental, immedi-
ate. In the transition to Christian culture, what was under developed in 
the antique reign of beauty came to be emphasized: mediation, which is 
to say, reflection. Thus the reign of philosophy was inaugurated, and art 
started to wane. This, Ciezskowski argued, is why Schiller was ultimately 
wrong to think that classical antiquity can still serve as a model. We can-
not regress to a true aesthetic state; we have, as it were, been permanently 
infected by reflection. ‘Beauty has become truth, the artistic life of man-
kind has been absorbed into its philosophical idea.’8
8 August Cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838), Hamburg 1981, p. 91.
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However, in Cieszkowski’s tripartite system, the thesis (classical art: 
the concrete, sensuousness) and the antithesis (modern philosophy: 
abstraction, reflection) have to be followed by a future synthesis. This is 
where political radicals, including the young Marx, pricked up their ears. 
If art and philosophy are each a different synthesis of being and thought, 
which in the case of art is dominated by being, and in the case of phi-
losophy by thought, then the third and higher synthesis will subsume 
both under the act (Tat), which is to say: art and philosophy will both 
be subsumed under a new praxis, and be thereby realized on a higher 
level.9 In this way, Cieszkowski transformed the Hegelian notion of the 
end of art: in its highest sense art has come to an end, but so has phi-
losophy, and both will return transformed—as lived praxis—in the acts 
of what is both lived art and lived philosophy. Even though he was not a 
political radical, Cieszkowski considered the works of utopian socialists 
such as Saint-Simon and Fourier to be indicative of the beginning of 
this new era.10
His critique of Schiller notwithstanding, Cieszkowski sounded a decid-
edly Schillerian note when he discussed the status of art in the third phase 
of Spirit. If the new praxis was to put the philosophy that dominated 
the second phase into action, it would also herald a return to Ancient 
Greece by replacing the artificial life (künstliches Leben) that dominated 
the Germano-Christian world with a true art-life (Kunstleben).11 This 
return, however, would involve a step forward: the new culture of the 
Tat will effect the reconciliation of nature and reason by elevating and 
transforming nature. Cieszkowski’s notion of the act is rather volun-
tarist; the act is an expression of a will, and its result is the practical 
realization of thought. He paid little attention to the act as a leap that 
produces Tatsachen unforeseen by theoretical thought. It is here that the 
discourse on play instigated by Schiller can supplement and transform 
Cieszkowski’s idealism.
Every man a mad king
A dialectic between Schiller’s notion of aesthetic play and Cieszkowski’s 
theory of the act returned in new forms in the post-war era, traversing 
and animating the practices of the artistic avant-gardes of the 1950s and 
60s. This was a period when the moment seemed to have come for play 
9 Cieszkowski, Prolegomena, pp. 106–22. 10 Cieszkowski, Prolegomena, p. 146.
11 Cieszkowski, Prolegomena, p. 144.
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finally to divest itself of its anachronistic traits; when the playful future 
seemed about to become present. From the ‘happenings’ initiated by 
artists such as Allan Kaprow to Fluxus events, a ‘ludic turn’ took place 
in the 1960s. Consciously or not, this amounted to a reactivation of 
Schiller’s notion of a radical art of life, conceived in terms of play, and in 
this context, the Schillerian tension between play as ideal and the reality 
of existing games returned in new forms. When Kaprow extolled ‘play as 
inherently worthwhile, play stripped of game theory, that is, of winners 
and losers’, he was only partially describing an actual practice. Specific 
performances or events were and could only be approximations of the 
ludic ideal of ‘free play’.12 The happening, like the Fluxus event, is best 
seen perhaps as a missed encounter, a failed realization the significance 
of which lies ultimately in its non-identity with its own ideal.
The early Situationist International fully participated in this ludic 
turn, yet Guy Debord and his allies increasingly became critical of its 
neo-Schillerian, idealist overtones; in this context, Debord returned to 
Cieszkowski’s critique. While conservatives such as Huizinga mourned 
the waning of play, the Situationists sought to revive and radicalize it. 
But they also looked back to the past, discovering models for the free 
play of the future in the seventeenth-century précieuses or King Ludwig of 
Bavaria’s fantastical Neuschwanstein castle.13 In his oneiric architecture, 
Ludwig had abandoned all modern conceptions of functionalism—the 
attack on the ‘idol of utility’ is another Schillerian motif—and in the 
process had transformed his whole life into play.14 Spanning an arc from 
Neuschwanstein to the ‘New Babylon’ envisioned by Constant, across 
the desert of the present, the Lettrist and Situationist internationals in 
the late 1950s effectively posited a future in which everyone would be a 
Mad King. This would be the culmination of the ‘massification’ of the 
homo ludens, as Constant would later put it.15
For Huizinga, play and games were intimately bound up with ‘primitive’ 
rituals, involving the consensual creation of temporary situations not 
ruled by normal behaviour; play is inherently distinguished from, and 
contrasted with, everyday life. The Situationists around Debord, on the 
12 Allan Kaprow, ‘The Education of the Un-Artist, Part II’, in Essays on the Blurring of 
Art and Life, Berkeley 1993, p. 121.
13 See Debord and Gil Wolman, ‘Pourquoi le lettrisme?’, and Debord, ‘L’architecture 
et le jeu’, both in Guy Debord présente Potlatch (1954–1957), Paris 1996, pp. 179, 157.
14 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, letter 2.
15 Constant, ‘Definitie’s [sic]’, in New Babylon, The Hague 1974, p. 29.
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other hand, rejected this opposition, arguing that free play was doomed 
to remain an illusion under the present conditions of capitalist society. 
If homo ludens was to become a historical reality, these conditions had 
to be changed, by means of a genuine revolution that would transform 
the whole of life. Roger Caillois had devoted great care to creating a clas-
sification of games, differentiating between games of competition, of 
chance, of vertigo and of mimicry.16 But the Situationists were not con-
tent with adding to one or more of these categories: rather than focusing 
on formalized games, they sought to set free play as such, with the rules 
being moral and thus unhindered by formalism and formality. Debord 
proudly claimed that the dérive announced a future culture of free play, 
in which the ‘play-element’ was no longer contained in definite games 
with their arbitrary rules, but takes over culture—becoming its founda-
tion, its rules becoming those of a free life.
In the face of the ludic rhetoric of the early 1960s, the Situationists—
firmly in the grip of the Debordian faction from 1962—were increasingly 
wary of overt playfulness, as they subjected the possible means for effect-
ing a revolutionary transformation of society to an ever more intense 
scrutiny. Did dérives or ‘constructed situations’ such as the labyrinth 
planned for Amsterdam’s Stedelijk Museum really contribute to the 
creation of a new life?17 Were they not in danger of becoming stand-ins 
for goals the actual achievement of which was continuously deferred? 
Le grand jeu was, after all, history itself, and the historical subject ‘can 
be nothing other than the self-production of the living—living people 
becoming masters and possessors of their own historical world and of 
their own fully conscious adventures.’18 As such, this vivant becomes the 
collective subject of history—the revolutionary proletarian class. The rev-
olution was to be the crucial move in the dialectical game of history—a 
game that affirms time, historical time and its ‘qualitative leaps, irrevers-
ible choices and once-in-a-lifetime opportunities.’19
Automation for the people
In contrast to the grand jeu of history, the danger of particular happenings 
and events was that they risked suggesting that society could effortlessly 
16 Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games (1958), Urbana/Chicago 2001.
17 Negotiations between the Situationists and the Stedelijk foundered in early 1960.
18 Debord, La Société du Spectacle (1967), Paris 1992, p. 70.
19 Internationale Situationniste, La Véritable Scission dans l’Internationale (1972), 
Paris 1998, p. 47.
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slide into a ludic state, a triumph of Schiller’s ‘play instinct’ in the form 
of a pastoral ‘art of life’ that did not require a revolution. Within the early 
Situationist International it became increasingly clear that Constant’s 
position was similar. In 1959, he characterized the Situationists as 
‘explorateurs spécialisés du jeu et du loisir’, and in another text he added: 
‘the reduction in the work necessary for production, through extended 
automation, will create a need for leisure, a diversity of behaviour 
and a change in the nature of the latter.’20 If there had hitherto been 
no historical basis for positing the image of a free man who would no 
longer have to struggle for his existence, technological developments 
would finally create a culture in which ‘every reason for aggression has 
been eliminated’, and ‘activity becomes creation’. These developments 
would necessitate the construction of ‘New Babylon’, his utopian mega-
structure for a future homo ludens freed from the need to work. 
While New Babylon was first developed within the Situationist 
International, there were irreconcilable differences between Constant 
and Debord, with Constant advocating an exclusively cultural revolu-
tion on the basis of the complete triumph of capitalism. To some extent 
the earlier Debord shared Constant’s enthusiasm for automation, argu-
ing in a text from 1957 that the Situationist perspective on the game 
‘is obviously linked to the continual and rapid increase of leisure time 
resulting from the level of productive forces our era has attained’.21 But 
in the 1960s, in a dialogue with Socialisme ou Barbarie and in particular 
with Daniel Blanchard, who was writing under the pseudonym Pierre 
Canjuers, Debord came to criticize what he regarded as a dependence 
on ‘actually existing automation’ for projections of the future. Whereas 
Constant and others tended to present automation as a liberation from 
work, Debord and Canjuers contended that in automation workers are 
dominated by machinery, and that what was needed was:
the development of new technologies designed to ensure the workers’ 
domination over the machines. This radical transformation of the meaning 
20 Constant, ‘Le Grand jeu à venir’ (1957), in Guy Debord présente Potlatch, p. 289; 
Constant, ‘Une autre ville pour une autre vie’, in Internationale Situationniste 3, 
December 1959, p. 39. Post-war discourse on automation had already been pre-
figured in the mid-nineteenth century, when a number of authors promised their 
bourgeois readers a bright, proletarian-free future, courtesy of technology.
21 Debord, ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de 
l’organisation et de l’action de la tendance Situationniste Internationale’ (1957) in 
Textes et documents situationnistes (1957–1960), Paris 2004, p. 18.
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of work will lead to a number of consequences, the main one of which is 
undoubtedly the shifting of the centre of interest of life from passive leisure 
to the new type of productive activity.22
It was not a matter, therefore, of taking the growth of ‘leisure’ for granted 
and filling it with play, or of Situationist ‘specialists’ devising new ways 
for people to spend their time.
For Debord, the problem was not so much that work needed to be abol-
ished in favour of play, but rather that it needed to become part of a 
continuum of human activities that would take on the form of play. While 
the transformation of work ‘does not mean that overnight all productive 
activities will become in themselves passionately interesting’, the aim 
should be ‘to work toward making them so, by a general and ongoing 
reconversion of the ends as well as the means of industrial work’. In 
such a society, ‘all activities will tend to blend the life previously sepa-
rated between leisure and work into a single but infinitely diversified 
flow. Production and consumption will merge and be superseded in the 
creative use of the goods of the society.’23 Ironically, the last sentences, 
which are meant to describe an alternative to capitalism rather than a 
new phase in its development, are perhaps the closest that Debord ever 
came to describing what has come to be termed post-Fordism.
Today, play has become a key component of labour in the ‘creative 
industries’. Publicity about the Googleplex, Google’s headquarters in 
California, emphasizes the presence of ping-pong tables and other ‘play-
ful’ elements. The fundamental transformations in advanced capitalism 
since the 1960s seem to echo the ludic turn in art, as developments 
which reconfigured art in terms of playful activity were soon integrated 
into popular culture in simplified and commodified forms. Eventually, 
as Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello have argued, a focus on ‘creativ-
ity, reactivity and flexibility’ seeped into the management texts of the 
1990s, as radical elements were appropriated by capitalism.24 However, 
this does not mean that we should—in the manner of Peter Bürger—
condemn the neo-avant-garde wholesale. A recent ‘re-imagining’ of 
22 Debord and Canjuers, ‘Preliminaries Toward Defining a Unitary Revolutionary 
Programme’ (1960), in Situationist International Anthology, Berkeley 1981.
23 Debord and Canjuers, ‘Preliminaries’.
24 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, London and New 
York 2005, pp. 3–101.
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a 1960s Kaprow piece suggests a more complex narrative than one of 
complete assimilation. 
In the 2007 Van Abbemuseum Kaprow retrospective, one space con-
tained a new version of the artist’s 1963 Push and Pull: A Furniture comedy 
for Hans Hofmann. The original, made for a show of works by former 
students of Hofmann, consisted of two furnished rooms which visitors 
could re-arrange; the new version consisted of a space with coloured 
exercise balls to sit on while watching videos; the balls would sometimes 
roll into the next space, dubbed an ‘agency for Action’. This was an office 
space in which one could find, for instance, photocopied instructions for 
happenings. With its generic office look and aura of administrative aes-
thetics, with a hint of Googleplex via the exercise balls, this space seemed 
singularly inappropriate and jarring. But perhaps this quasi-corporate 
version of Kaprow’s piece is in fact an apt actualization, acknowledging 
both the work’s dated historical status and the historical potential it may 
still hold, encapsulated in the scores for happenings, hinting at a free 
play never to be exhausted by any of its realizations.
Game controllers
As a quasi-ludic work environment, the Googleplex exemplifies the 
contemporary integration of play into ‘algorithmic machines’—an inte-
gration that goes beyond video games.25 Playing becomes gaming; the 
post-war ‘game theory’ associated with cybernetics and military research 
has won out over the neo-avant-garde’s ‘free play’, even if the former 
sometimes dresses itself in the latter’s garb. In the late 1940s and 1950s, 
theorists of cybernetics such as Norbert Wiener not only analysed com-
munication between humans, between machines, and between humans 
and machines as fundamentally homologous processes; they also pre-
sented communication as a form of control, and vice versa.26 It is no 
coincidence that it was in the context of cybernetic research that modern 
game theory was formalized. If the Situationists demanded new forms 
of play that could not be contained by any fixed set of rules, game theory 
was very much dependent on such rules, on the permutations of a lim-
ited set of options, and on the analysis and development of strategies 
depending on feedback in this circumscribed field—feedback in the 
25 Alexander Galloway, Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture, Minneapolis 2006.
26 See for instance Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics 
and Society, Boston 1950, pp. 16–8.
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form of moves made by an opponent who may or may not be human. 
Wiener noted that ‘there are in existence government agencies bent on 
applying [the theory of games] to military and quasi-military aggressive 
and defensive purposes.’27 The development of flight and fight simu-
lators would become an essential element of this project, the ‘civilian’ 
offshoots of which help transform technology and culture.
Constant, who had read Wiener, characterized the computer as the ‘slave’ 
of the new society. In 1968, a final model for New Babylon included 
blinking lights and speakers, and although those had to be operated man-
ually, it suggested an environment shaped by the interaction between 
humans and advanced machinery. Two years earlier, a life-size ‘test 
space’ for New Babylon had been created in Rotterdam, with rooms that 
included a crawl space, a ‘sonorium’, large metal scaffolding, a labyrinth 
of doors (an idea adapted from the Situationists’ plan for the Stedelijk 
Museum in 1959) and an ‘odoratorium’. Because Constant and his team 
were anxious for feedback from visitors, they provided a wall on which 
comments could be scrawled as well as a table with questionnaires and 
phones that could record spoken comments. In this rather technocratic 
set-up, play was a matter of planning. When, in 1973, Constant looked 
back on this experiment, he stressed the need to give the out-of-work 
subject of the future something to do, and this something could only be 
the exploration of a dynamic, perpetually changing environment. In the 
end, Constant’s depoliticized version of Situationist play collapsed into 
cybernetic control.28
The second half of the 1960s saw an increasing contestation of cybernet-
ics as dominant discourse—even though the long-term nature of many 
large cybernetics-inspired ‘art and technology’ projects meant that they 
only came to fruition around 1970–71, when the cultural climate had 
turned hostile towards them.29 In 1964–65 Debord and the Situationists 
waged a campaign against the cybernetician Abraham A. Moles, who 
stood for everything that had to be fought: a culture of specialists of 
control, of tweaking and refining the system through orchestrated 
27 Wiener, Human Use, p. 181.
28 Mark Wigley, Constant’s New Babylon: The Hyper-Architecture of Desire, Rotterdam 
1998, pp. 63–5.
29 See Artforum’s two highly critical reviews of the 1971 Art & Technology show at 
the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Jack Burnham’s ‘Corporate Art’ and Max 
Kozloff’s scathing ‘The Multimillion Dollar Art Boondoggle’, in Artforum X, no. 2, 
October 1971, pp. 66–76.
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feedback.30 If Constant and the expelled Scandinavian Situationists 
favoured evolution, their approach risked being complicit with manage-
rial cybernetics; Debord hence pushed the project of a revolutionary leap 
beyond the present system, a move not within the game but off the play-
ing field, off the board altogether.
Elaborating on and detourning Foucault, Deleuze famously contrasted 
the ‘disciplinary societies’ of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies with the more recent formation he dubbed—taking a cue from 
Burroughs—‘the society of control’. In this society, which is crucially 
dependent on information technology, rather than simply abolishing 
work, automation has transformed it. We play while we work and vice 
versa. If the relationship between play and discipline is one of latent 
or active antagonism, play and control form an easy alliance. Play 
demands active involvement, not passive submission; we are continu-
ously prompted to offer feedback, to get involved—in politics and online 
stores, in museums and the workplace. Game theory has draped itself 
in the rhetoric of free play, promising the liberated time of play in the 
feedback of cybernetic games. 
Though the discourse of cybernetics may long since have been relegated 
to limbo, the contemporary society of control is cybernetics in action. It 
is not the Situationist theory and praxis of play that has shaped society 
but the game theory that developed in the sphere of cybernetics. This 
was connected from the start to questions of military strategy and to the 
development of technology offering new ways to simulate or play mili-
tary conflicts. For example, the Cathode Ray Tube Amusement Device, 
an early precursor to the video game patented in 1948, simulated missile 
attacks and was based on Second World War radar displays. The nexus 
between gaming and war remained a constant feature as the video-
game’s popularity increased exponentially, and was further strengthened 
by the spread of home computers and leaps in processing power. Now 
the boundaries between the conduct of war and role-playing games have 
become increasingly blurred: the us drones hitting villagers in Yemen, 
Pakistan and elsewhere are controlled with a joystick from bunkers far 
removed from the battlefield, which for one set of combatants appears only 
as a digital image. In his two-channel video projection Immersion (2009), 
Harun Farocki explores these connections, following the demonstration 
30 See inter alia ‘Correspondance avec un cybernéticien’, in Internationale 
Situationniste 9, August 1964, pp. 44–8.
lütticken: Playtimes 137
of software that allows traumatized us soldiers to relive battle events—
the simulation of war serving both as training and as therapy.
It is not only crucial to go beyond analyses of ‘really existing games’ that 
affirm their horizon; it is equally important to go beyond abstract cel-
ebrations of the ludic. Contrary to Constant’s rhetoric, play in itself is not 
progressive, let alone revolutionary. There are far too many ‘explorateurs 
spécialisés du jeu et des loisirs’. There are also far too many people and 
products dubbed ‘game changers’; yet that debased term does suggest 
what is needed, and what its use and abuse seems designed to prevent. 
How can one bring out the antagonisms that are so carefully managed 
by the games of control, with their continual adaptations and adjust-
ments? How to unravel ‘the link between participation and control’ that, 
as Marina Vishmidt argues, ‘extends into the nature of contemporary 
work, transformed by decades of de-regulation and flexible production 
schedules, not to mention the hegemonic advance of the “creative indus-
tries” into a landscape in which participation and exploitation cannot be 
separated practically or theoretically’? Vishmidt points out that 
the rise of self-employment and short contracts, in the most menial rungs 
of the service sectors . . . ensures that exploitation becomes as fragmented 
and individualized as the conditions of work themselves, and antagonism 
between the goals of workers and capital becomes something quite abstract, 
dissolving into meaninglessness.31
If materialist critique is rightfully suspicious of many claims made 
for contemporary capitalism under monikers such as post-Fordism 
and immaterial labour, in both its celebratory and critical versions, it 
would be a mistake to cast all this aside as mere illusion. It is com-
paratively easy to deflate claims about the importance of creativity and 
play in post-Fordist production, but such ideological constructs exist 
in a complex relation with shifting economic and social conditions. A 
recent television commercial for a German telecom provider has office 
workers and managers absconding from the office, enjoying a holiday 
out in the open, because they can effortlessly access their email. The 
message is clear: work becomes play. Or is it the other way around? 
‘Free time’ or leisure was always dedicated to restoring the workers’ 
faculties, keeping them fit; now, as the boundaries erode, people pro-
crastinate on the internet in their office and work on their ‘own’ time, 
31 Marina Vishmidt, ‘Once Again on the Idea of Systems’, talk given at Künstlerhaus 
Stuttgart, 22 May 2009.
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integrating themselves ever more playfully and completely into scripts 
written for them, in which open-ended interactive possibilities mask a 
predetermined general direction.
As the number of industrial jobs decreases in the West, ideological 
notions such as that of the ‘creative industry’ suggest the possibility of a 
new wave of accumulation; but as Gopal Balakrishnan argues, we may in 
fact witness neoliberal wealth redistribution from bottom to top in what 
is increasingly a stationary economy.32 In this context, the rhetoric of cre-
ativity and playfulness legitimizes unprecedented disparities in income 
between the underprivileged and the most successful of global ‘players’, 
whose incomes and bonuses supposedly reflect their unique, highly 
individual skills. On the other hand, there is a reserve army of ‘creative 
workers’ who have far less security and, in many cases, a lower income 
than traditional workers. They are the avant-garde of self-exploitation—
the underpaid mirror image of the overpaid few. Since emphasis on 
creativity and playfulness is perfect for legitimizing ever-increasing in-
equality in a stationary or shrinking economy, it is not to be expected that 
recent upheavals signal the end of such discourse.
The game of history
Play has arrived in the present; but what kind of play, and whose present? 
Despite their differences, Constant and Debord agreed on the need for a 
different conception and practice of history. History should no longer be 
imposed on the vast majority of people by a ruling class; rather, life was 
to become history. As Debord put it, the ‘self-production of the living’ 
was the process of ‘people becoming masters and possessors of their 
own historical world’, conscious of the historical game. In his more uto-
pian mode, Constant made a similar point: life was to become a series 
of ludic acts generating other acts.33 Released from the constraints of 
conventional rules and allotted pockets of survival, play—as the ‘art of 
life’ par excellence—becomes living history.
Strategy came to play an increasingly prominent role in Debord’s life 
and work—in 1974, he stated that the important theoreticians were 
no longer primarily Hegel, Marx and Lautréamont, but Thucydides, 
32 Gopal Balakrishnan, ‘Speculations on the Stationary State’, in nlr 59, Sept–Oct 
2009.
33 See J. L. Locher, ‘Inleiding’, in New Babylon.
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Machiavelli and Clausewitz.34 This strategic turn manifested itself in his 
Game of War, developed originally in the late 1960s and produced in a 
limited edition a decade later. This came at a time when video games 
were making serious inroads into popular culture, even shaping the 
structure of blockbuster films. But rather than analysing the spectacle’s 
cybernetic turn, Debord made a defiantly anachronistic board game. In 
spite of the fundamental twentieth-century transformations of warfare, 
Debord’s Game of War harks back to the Kriegsspiel table constructed 
by the Prussian official Georg Leopold von Reiswitz in 1812; elsewhere 
Debord stated that his game ultimately reflected pre-Napoleonic, 
18th-century warfare.35 Playing the Game of War is a strange experience; 
not particularly engaging as a board game, it becomes a historical game 
in a different way. If we do not merely see it as a symptom of retreat, a 
flight from history into historicism, we might say that it operates differ-
ently from ‘normal’, successful games. Going over moves and strategies 
in an archaic setting becomes a play with history.
The groups Class Wargames and Radical Software have created their 
own versions and organized public matches of the game. In an online 
film about the Game of War, Class Wargames states that ‘the game of 
war is the ludic manifestation of class war’. Mimicking the imperatives 
of commercials and advertisements, the voice-over exhorts the viewer 
to ‘be like Napoleon’ and states that every player of the Game of War 
should study the strategy employed by Frederick the Great during the 
Seven Years’ War—the monarch’s focus on good lines of communica-
tion being highly relevant for struggles in the ‘information society’. In 
fact, Debord’s emphasis on lines of communication may be seen as the 
one unmistakably up-to-date, ‘cybernetic’ element of the game.
But perhaps the outmoded elements that Debord introduces into the 
cybernetic society of control are more valuable than this ‘contempo-
rary’ ingredient. The digital version of the game created by the Radical 
Software Group stresses its alterity; it clearly could not be much more dif-
ferent either from ‘ego shooter’ war games or, as Radical Software Group 
member Alexander Galloway has stressed, from ‘real-time strategy 
games’ and ‘swarm games’.36 With their multiple actors and multiplicity 
34 Debord, letter to Eduardo Rothe, 21 February 1974, in Correspondance, vol. 5, Paris 
2005, p. 127
35 Debord, letter to Gérard Lebovici, 24 May 1976, in Correspondance, vol. 5, p. 351.
36 Galloway, lecture at Mediamatic, Amsterdam, 25 October 2007.
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of events unfolding in real time, such games are far removed from the 
chess-like sequences of Debord’s game, unfolding in an abstract tempo-
rality ruled by two commanders who move around the troops of history. 
In an age of swarming multitudes and of a search for new forms of 
political agency, this type of game seems irrelevant—and yet, there has 
been significant interest in Debord’s war game in recent years.
Part of the reason may be that playing this anachronistic strategy game 
suggests that anachronisms themselves may hold a strategic potential. 
If the aim is to go beyond the present, to create a series of events whose 
logic breaks the horizon of the current social situation, then anachro-
nistic interventions in the present are vital. In this light, the history of 
contestation after 1968 has been marked by the search for more precise, 
more pointed anachronisms—for moves that could indeed have an effect, 
however marginal or unpredictable, in the multi-player game of history.
